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Abstract 
In this paper we present a global description of a telematic voting system based 
on advanced cryptography and on the use of smart cards (VOTESCRIPT system) 
whose most outstanding characteristic is the ability to verify that the tally carried 
out by the system is correct, meaning that the results published by the system 
correspond with votes cast. The VOTESCRIPT system provides an individual 
verification mechanism allowing each Voter to confirm whether his vote has been 
correctly counted. The innovation with respect to other solutions lies in the fact 
that the verification process is private so that Voters have no way of proving what 
they voted in the presence of a non-authorized third party. Vote buying and selling 
or any other kind of extortion are prevented. The existence of the Intervention 
Systems allows the whole electoral process to be controlled by groups of citizens 
or authorized candidatures. In addition to this the system can simply make an 
audit not only of the final results, but also of the whole process. Global 
verification provides the Scrutineers with robust cryptographic evidence which 
enables unequivocal proof if the system has operated in a fraudulent way. 
1. VERIFICATION: THE KEY POINT OF THE TELEMATIC VOTING 
SYSTEM 
Currently, many Governments and Administrations of different countries are 
promoting the development of pilot schemes on telematic voting. We understand a 
telematic voting system as one in which votes are computer generated and then 
sent to a remote Polling Station by means of telematic networks. 
 A telematic voting system must not only be able to offer the same security 
guarantees as those provided by a traditional voting system (such as: protecting 
Voter anonymity, avoiding vote casting by non-authorized Voters or multiple 
voting, while ensuring a correct vote count), but also to guarantee suitable 
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protection of votes cast while in transit through the network. In this sense the 
system must prevent votes from being recognized, modified or excluded. 
Nevertheless, few schemes published till now cover these new requirements 
inherent to telematic voting, such as the need for powerful verification tools which 
help guarantee and prove that the results are correct even in the event of possible 
collusion between the system agents. Nor do these systems provide for 
Scrutineers1 who undertake traditional supervision of the correct progress of the 
entire voting process.  
 In Spain, the Electoral Processes Department of the Ministry of Interior 
together with the Spanish Royal Mint undertook a project whose purpose was to 
study the viability of implementing an electronic voting system as an alternative 
to the present postal vote for Spanish residents abroad.  
 This research group, linked from its origins to the above mentioned project, 
developed a theoretical model for the voting system. The Royal Mint 
implemented its own subset of our project, tested in El Hoyo de Pinares (Spain, 
Ávila) in March of 2003.  
  In order to develop the theoretical model we have worked in two different and 
complementary areas: the security of the entire voting system and the exclusion of 
any cultural barriers and suspicions which might hamper its acceptance by 
citizens. While the corresponding engineering tasks were being performed, the 
psychological, politological and legal analysis necessary to determine the 
system’s viability was also carried out [6].  
 In this paper we present an improved version of the developed system 
implemented by the Royal Mint and tested in El Hoyo de Pinares, reinforcing the 
verification aspect as the key point in achieving wholehearted approval by society.  
2.  COMMUNICATION SCENARIO  
The VOTESCRIPT system2 supports telematic votes in an environment in which 
Voters cast their votes from any point provided for this purpose and these votes 
are collected in a remote ballot box. VOTESCRIPT aims to telematically 
reproduce the decentralized control guarantees of the conventional system, based 
on the existence of different polling stations, each equipped with a group of 
persons responsible for their functioning.  
 
2.1. AUTOMATIC AGENTS AND SYSTEMS 
A group of automatic systems using only previously published programmes takes 
part in the communication scenario considered in VOTESCRIPT, with a 
consequent possibility of evaluation and audit performed by all the entities 
involved in the voting process. This group of systems is shown in Figure 1.  They 
are as follows: 
                                                 
1 Scrutineer: an official examiner or counter of the votes in VOTESCRIPT system acting on behalf 
of the citizens or candidatures 
2 This system has been developed within VOTESCRIPT projects (Secured Electronic Voting 
based on Advanced Cryptography) sponsored by National Council for Science and Technology of 
Spain (TIC2000-1630, TIC2002-4223 and TIC2003-2141) 




Figure 1. Architecture of the VOTESCRIPT system 
 
o Authentication Points (APs). These are computers equipped with a card 
reader but with no cryptographic capacity. Here the Voter begins the 
voting process. In VOTESCRIPT the Voter may choose any of the 
available APs to authenticate identity. 
o Ballot Points (BPs). In the same way as the APs these are computers 
equipped with a card reader but with no cryptographic capacity. Here the 
Voter finds all the resources necessary to help him cast the vote. The BPs 
are installed in cabins which isolate the Voter from external interference.  
In VOTESCRIPT the Voter may cast his vote at any of the available BPs. 
o An Administration System (may be considered official), in charge of the 
Voter authentication process. 
o Different Intervention Systems (ISs). These are computers managed by 
each of the citizen’s group or candidatures authorized to supervise voting, 
whose objective is to complement the Administrator’s tasks. The fact that 
the ISs are controlled by different candidatures that support opposed 
interests guarantees that collusion between these agents within the system 
will not occur.  
o A Ballot Box (BB) collects the electronic votes cast by the Voters and 
returns the voting receipts. BB is not able to decrypt the vote. 
o A Tallier (may be considered official) counts the votes. Its private key is 
shared secret, held only by the Administrator and the Scrutineers and it is 
revealed only when votes reception is complete.  
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o Different Tally Intervention Systems to supervise the task carried out by 
the official Tallier.  
o Verification Points allowing the Voter to confirm that his vote has been 
correctly counted. 
o A Tally Board where the results are kept and shown for a short period of 
time. Its private key is a shared secret, held by the Administrator and the 
Scrutineers and revealed just before individual verification starts. 
o Smart cards allowing owner identification and decoding of confidential 
information addressed to it, plus signature of all information requiring 
proof of origin and the integrity guarantees. In particular, every Voter 
possesses a voting smart card Java Card (VC) [11] which includes 
cryptographic algorithms specially designed for VOTESCRIPT and also 
executes a part of the Voter’s application in order to increase the global 
security of the system.  
2.2. PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCESS  
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the system contemplates the existence of 
a group of persons directly present in the voting, counting and verification 
processes. All these persons must possess some kind of smart card which would 
help them to interact with the VOTESCRIPT agents. 
o Voters. 
o An Administrator of the Administration System. 
o Scrutineers responsible for each one of the Intervention Systems. 
o Election Authority (EA), consisting of a group of persons whose 
responsibilities are general control of the system and resolving possible 
complaints.  
2.3. SMART CARDS: KEYS AND IDENTIFIERS 
As a previous step to voting, every Voter will have received the Voter’s Card and 
the Voter’s identifier which is known to all the members taking part in voting 
control.  
 The Administration System, the Intervention Systems, the Ballot Box, the 
Tallier together with the Tally Intervention System, the Tally Board and the 
Election Authority each have their own key pair (a public and a private key). All 
their public keys, by means of their correspondent certificates are known to all 
telematic agents and to all the persons participating in the voting system using 
their smart card.  
 The smart card enables, on one hand, the Voter’s and agent’s private keys to 
be kept safely in order to guarantee their identity, and on the other hand, permits 
safe storage of the pieces of information generated throughout the voting process.  
 In the voting process, the Voter’s applications are in charge of dialoguing 
with the Voter to authenticate him and to ask for his voting option as well as to 
carry out secure dialogue among the different system agents. This process is 
undertaken by means of appropriate cryptographic operations inside the card. 
From a practical point of view, this solution is not feasible using a conventional 
smart card, but it can be obtained using the new generation of smart cards: Java 
Cards. In fact, these cards, besides pooling all the security requirements of the 
conventional smart cards, also allow storage and later execution of different user 
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applications, developed in Java language. This means that it is a suitable location 
for the Voter’s application due to the new features of Java Card combined with 
the tamper-proof characteristics of any type of smart card.  
3. GLOBAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE SYSTEM  
3.1. OUTLINED PROCEDURE OF VOTE DELIVERY  
During a limited period, the citizens will fulfil the steps we describe in the 
following paragraphs. Meanwhile the Administration System and the Intervention 
Systems are ready to issue authorizations for the legitimate Voters who will 
request them and the Ballot Box is ready to receive the votes and return the 
receipts. (See Figure 1)  
Relation between the Voter and the Authentication Point  
1) Once at the Authentication Point, the Voter introduces his Voter’s Card (VC) 
into the card reader. The Authentication Point checks the validity of the card 
by means of a generic identifier possessed by all cards participating in voting. 
Therefore, any attempt to introduce a different kind of card into the card 
reader will be rejected. The Voter authenticates himself on his card by means 
of a biometric identification mechanism.3 
2) The Voter’s Card contains the key pair (the public and the private key) of 
Voters. Additionally, within the VC an asymmetric voting key pair is 
generated (kdV, keV), which is stored in such a way that not even the Voter 
himself may read it. The card itself also generates the blinding factors [14] to 
blind the previously generated kdV key (using the correspondent blinding 
factor) for the Administration System and for each one of the Intervention 
Systems, creating a kdV key blinded for each one of the destiny entities of the 
message. The card signs a piece of information which consists of a Voter’s 
identifier and all the previously blinded keys, after which it encrypts all this 
data with the public key of the Administration System for ensuring 
confidentiality. 
3) Using the information referred to in the previous step, the Authentication 
Point generates an APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit) and sends it to the 
Administration System.  
4) The Administration System reads and decrypts the data inside the APDU and 
then sends all the information to all the Intervention Systems. Every 
Intervention System, in the same way as the Administration System, will have 
to confirm that the received Voter’s identifier is correct4. That is to say, it 
confirms that the identifier is included in the list of valid identifiers, that the 
signature of the Voter making the request is valid and that no blinded key 
                                                 
3 In the framework of our proposal the smart card is the one to store the biometric data using the 
Authentication Point as a simple intermediary. This kind of data does not travel through the 
network and is neither stored in a BP, making impossible a creation of “biometric” lists. 
4 The fact that the Administration System checks the validity of the request at the same time as the 
Intervention Systems permits to keep a log of such an incident (in the same way as in a 
conventional voting by means of a ballot in Spain). 
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associated to the mentioned identifier has been previously received. 
Otherwise, the request is rejected5. 
5) Once confirmed that the received Voter’s identifier is valid, every Intervention 
System will sign its correspondent blinded kdV key and will return the result to 
the Administration System. The Administration System does the same with its 
corresponding blinded kdV key and attaches it to the blinded keys signed by the 
ISs, creating in this way a signed keys set which will be transformed into an 
“authorization” once they are decrypted and unblinded by the Voter’s Card.  
6) This signed keys set  is signed by the Administration System and encrypted 
with the Voter’s public key, after that it is sent (by means of an APDU) to the 
Authentication Point. In this way the VC will be the only one capable of 
reading the signed keys set (data confidentiality). It also has the guarantee that 
the Administration System was the one to return it the signed keys set.  
7) The data contained in the APDU, which has been received from the 
Administration System, is delivered to the Voter’s Card by the Authentication 
Point. The VC decrypts the information using first the Voter’s private key and 
then checks the Administration System signature. Once the blinded signed 
keys set are read (step 5), the VC excludes the blinded factor, obtaining the kdV 
signed by the Administration System together with the kdV signed by each 
Intervention System. Next it checks that Administration and Intervention 
System signatures on the keys are correct. If this is the case, interaction 
between the Voter and the Authentication Point has finished and the Voter’s 
Card keeps the signatures of its kdV which will next be used as the 
authorization during the voting process. There is only one legitimate Voter 
able to possess it and this Voter may only possess a single authorization. 
Relation between the Voter and the Ballot Point  
8) There are resources which will help the Voter to issue his vote and to send it 
to the Ballot Box at the Ballot Point (BP). The Voter, in the same way as he 
did at the AP, authenticates himself on the Card. 
9) The BP asks for the Voter’s vote by means of a dialogue in which the text and 
images simplify the Voter’s choice. The vote to be delivered is encrypted 
within the Voter’s Card with  keV (vote encrypting key).This implies that the 
vote can only be decrypted by using kdV key (vote decrypting key), which is the 
previous one’s pair. In this way the vote and the “authorization” signed by 
Intervention and Administration Systems are inseparably interlinked.  
The VC creates a piece of information containing the encrypted vote, the kdV 
key and the authorization. Next this piece of information is “put” inside the 
Secure Envelope T (a Secure Envelope T is confidential to the Tallier)6. After 
that a symmetric key is generated within the Voter Card which joins the 
Secure Envelope T and both are “put” inside a new Secure Envelope BB which 
only a Ballot Box can open. Next the Card delivers the Secure Envelope BB to 
the Ballot Point in order to be sent immediately to the Ballot Box. This double 
secure envelope, together with the procedures needed to put the Tallier into 
                                                 
5 In this paper we do not take in consideration the behaviour of the system in case of incidents or 
possible communication problems.  
6 The mechanism used for this Secure Envelope is similar to the one usually called Secure Channel 
which offers major security protections than the conventional digital envelope.  
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operation, guarantees that it is impossible for any entity or group of entities to 
find out the partial results while there are still Voters waiting to cast their vote. 
10) At the Ballot Point an APDU with the Secure Envelope BB is generated and it 
is sent to the Ballot Box so confidentiality is guaranteed.  
11) After excluding the Secure Envelope BB which protects the information 
received, the Ballot Box gets the symmetric key and the piece of information 
contained in the Secure Envelope T. The Ballot Box retains these Secure 
Envelopes T until the voting period is finished. In order to generate the voting 
receipt, the Ballot Box carries out the following operations: 
a)  Signs the Secure Envelope T (received in the previous step). 
b) Encrypts this piece of information with the Election Authority’s (EA) 
public key.  This encrypted information will be the voting receipt.  
c)  Signs the voting receipt. 
d) Encrypts the voting receipt signed in the previous step with the symmetric 
key received from the Voter Card.  
Once these four operations are completed, the Ballot Box sends the result 
to the Ballot Point.  
12) The Ballot Point delivers the received information to the Voter Card which 
decrypts the information, obtaining the voting receipt. Next it verifies that the 
Ballot Box signature is correct (even though it can not find out its content as it 
is encrypted with the public key of the Election Authority). The voting receipt 
is stored in the Voter Card and it is available only for the Election Authority 
(according to the rules established) once the voting process is finished in case 
of a claim.  
The Voter is informed at the Ballot Point that the process of delivery of his 
vote has ended. A Voter Card which has completed the previous process and 
has stored its receipt, will reject a new process of vote delivery, even if the 
Voter, its owner, tries to do so (the card is tamper-proof) guaranteeing that 
each Voter may only vote once.  
3.2. OPENING BALLOT BOX AND VOTE TALLYING  
The Tallier and the Tally Intervention System are the only ones who can open 
(read) these votes after the Administrator and the Scrutineers have collaborated in 
the process of generating their secret key (votes are protected inside the Secure 
Envelopes T).  
1) To proceed to the opening of the Ballot Box the physical presence of the 
Administrator and enough Scrutineers is required (depending on the rules 
established). These persons are to insert their respective smart cards into the 
Ballot Box’ card readers prepared for this purpose and they are to authenticate 
themselves on them biometrically or by means of a PIN. The opening process 
consists in modifying the order of appearance of the records by the Ballot Box 
and in sending them to the Tallier and to the Tally Intervention Systems. At 
the same time the Ballot Box provides persons responsible for the 
management and those responsible for supervising the electoral system with a 
list containing all the information sent (the encrypted votes inside the Secure 
Envelopes T). At this moment all the information that the Ballot Box has been 
collecting during its work is removed. The removal process will be audited by 
persons with specific authorization. The data concerning the transferred 
records is known also by a group of persons in order to provide mechanisms to 
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check that the Tallier and the Tally Intervention Systems receive the same 
information and, as explained below in the verification paragraph, to identify 
the element causing a malfunction in case an alteration of the votes is 
detected.  
2) Next the votes are counted. Before decrypting the votes once again the 
Administrator and the Scrutineers with their smart cards (by means of a shared 
secret procedure) together supply the Tallier and the Tally Intervention 
Systems with their private key (which has been hidden till this moment). This 
key permits the Tallier and the Tally Intervention Systems to come into 
operation. The Tallier “opens” the Secure Envelope T which contains the vote 
information described in step 9 above. For each vote it checks that the kdV 
(used to open an encrypted vote) has been correctly signed by the 
Administration System and the Intervention Systems, and if so, it decrypts the 
vote. The results obtained by Tallier and the Tally Intervention Systems must 
be the same.  
The kdV key signed by the Administration and the Intervention System 
guarantees that none but a single authorized Voter can deliver a valid vote. 
The inseparable interlink between the Vote and the Authorization takes place 
because only the Voter’s Card knows the value of the symmetric kdV key, (keV). 
The integrity and the confidentiality of the Vote are guaranteed by the Secure 
Envelope procedures. Although the Voter’s Card prevents the Voter from 
voting more than once, in the event this protection is violated, the Tallier will 
detect the kdV duplicity and it rectifies this incident. 
Once the tally is completed, the Tallier transfers the information to the Tally 
Board which will make known the voting results to the persons responsible for 
management and supervision of the electoral system. These results are 
gathered in a list and its entries are as follows: a) a clear vote b) the kdV key c) 
the kdV key signed by the Administration System and d) the kdV key signed by 
each of the Intervention Systems. This list and the tasks completed by 
Intervention Systems help to carry out the verification steps described in the 
following paragraphs.  
The final results, made public to citizens, correspond to the votes for each 
candidature on the Tally Board.  
3.3. VERIFICATION OF THE VOTING RESULTS 
VOTESCRIPT allows two kinds of verification to be performed: individual 
verification by the Voter and global verification of the results by the candidatures 
or authorized citizen groups. 
 Individual verification, in which every Voter provides evidence stored in his 
card, will prevent the system (basically the Ballot Box) from the temptation of 
eliminating votes, since each Voter card contains a vote signed by the Ballot Box 
which should have been processed at the moment of the tallying. If the vote has 
been modified or excluded by the Ballot Box, it will not appear in the list of 
transferred records. If the vote has been modified by the Tallier, it has to prove 
that it has got another vote with the same kdV signed by all Administration and 
Intervention Systems; otherwise there is evidence of the Tallier committing 
mistakes or fraud.  
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 Global verification, together with the Intervention Systems supervising the 
tasks of the Administration System, detects any unauthorised vote cast as it would 
not be provided with a correctly signed Authorization.  
3.3.1.  Individual verification 
Once the voting period has finished, each Voter may independently check if his 
vote has been properly included. This verification is carried out by the Voter on 
his own initiative making use of the resources guaranteeing his anonymity and 
protection from coercion.  
The Voter should go to the Verification Point (always by himself), and uses his 
card to ask to be shown the associated vote.  
At the Verification Point, in order to guarantee the Voter’s protection from 
external espionage, the same measures as those to cast the vote at the Ballot Point 
must be taken.  
Relation between the Voter and the Verification Point 
The Figure 2 illustrates the communication explained below: 
Figure 2. Dialogue among smart card, Verification Point and Tally Board 
1) The system installed at the Verification Point has resources allowing 
communication with the Tally Board (TB). The Voter authenticates himself on 
the Voter Card in the same way as he did at AP (step 1 of Relation between 
the Voter and the Authentication Point).  
2) By means of a dialoguing process between the Verification Point and the 
Voter Card, the Voter Card generates a symmetric key and creates a piece of 
information which contains the kdV key and the symmetric key which are put 
inside the Secure Envelope TB. This Secure Envelope is immediately 









the APDU Eliminate the Secure Envelope TB.
Get the clear Vote from the list 
and sign it





 Remove all the information gained
 in the verification phase
 Put KdV and Ks  into the
 Secure Envelope TB
 
 Remove all the information 
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Decrypt the information
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3) The Tally Board obtains the kdV key coming from the Voter’s Card and 
accesses the previously published list containing the kdV key besides the vote.  
4) The Tally Board returns to the Verification Point one signed piece of 
information containing the vote associated to this kdV key and encrypted with 
the symmetric key recently received inside of the Secure Envelope TB.  
5) The Verification Point transfers this piece of information to the Voter’s Card.  
6) The Voter’s Cards decrypts the received information, checks the TB’s 
signature and if everything is correct, sends the clear vote to the Verification 
Point showing the Voter the associated vote in such a way that the Voter is the 
only one who can read it.  
7) All the information collected during this transaction with the Verification 
Point is removed from the Voter’s Card.  
8) Once the established period to carry out individual verification has finished, 
the destruction process of all information (including the private key from the 
Tally Board) will be audited.  
 
In case of non-agreement with the option seen, the Voter may lodge a 
complaint with the Election Authority. 
After receiving the Voter’s Card the Election Authority may unequivocally 
prove correct or incorrect vote processing, as it has resources independent of the 
previously described networks allowing confidential access to:   
o The Voter’s kdV key stored in his card. 
o The voting receipt sent by the Ballot Box to the Voter.  
o The Tallier’s records which relate the kdV key signed by the Administration 
and the Intervention Systems, the clear kdV and the vote encrypted with keV 
key.  
o The information supplied by the Ballot Box while transferring its content 
to the Tallier and to the Tally’s Intervention Systems.  
 
Once in its possession and relying on the robust cryptographic evidence, the 
Election Authority will determine if the system has falsified the data.  
There is a Secure Envelope (between the Voter and the Tallier) signed by the 
BB and encrypted with the EA’s public key in the Voter’s Card. As soon as the 
EA accesses the contents, it will verify that this piece of information has been 
supplied by the Ballot Box to the Tallier (and to the Tally Intervention Systems). 
If this is not the case, there is evidence of the vote’s destruction by the Ballot Box. 
If this information has been transferred, the Election Authority will use the 
Tallier’s secret key in order to “open” the Secure Envelope T stored in the card 
and will verify the result of the vote decrypt which must match with the 
information supplied by the Tally Board. An anomaly at this final stage will be 
also detected during global verification. Basically, this individual verification will 
prevent the Ballot Box from an attempt to exclude votes.  
3.3.2. Global Verification 
As has been already stated, after closing the Ballot Point, the Ballot Box will 
transfer all the Secure Envelopes T to the Tallier and to the Tally Intervention 
Systems which are to verify the correct performance of the Tallier.   
As the Ballot Box has provided persons responsible for management and 
supervision of the electoral system with the same information transferred to the 
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Tallier, the Tallier assumes full responsibility for the correct processing of each 
vote.  
Each Scrutineer will have his own machine (Tally Intervention System) where 
the said copy will be loaded. This machine has been previously audited by the 
experts in order to guarantee that it will only be able to tally. Any difference 
between the results obtained by the Tally Intervention Systems and those 
published by the Tally Board will be an indication of an anomaly. So neither the 
Tallier, nor the Tally Board may alter (add, exclude or modify) votes transferred 
from the Ballot Box without being detected.  
The list of the records received by the Tallier and the Tally Intervention System 
will be destroyed after the voting process is considered valid. This information 
destruction will have to be audited. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The technical solutions adopted to develop a voting system have very real social 
impact on preserving and enhancing citizens rights and liberties and, 
consequently, on the development of democracy in the Information Society.   
 The design of the Digital Democracy systems must have as its base a critical 
and exhaustive analysis of the experiences and proposals previously made and it 
must include multidisciplinary methodologies (technological, sociopolitical, and 
legal) in order to determine the requirements and evaluate the final system to be 
developed.  
 The VOTESCRIPT system, by means of applying this multidisciplinary 
methodology, has obtained more efficient solutions than previous models. It has 
contributed valid procedures to defend telematic voting from the disqualifying 
arguments of, for example, Mercury Report [7], with which this research group 
was fully in agreement. Our experience till now has answered citizen demands for 
guarantees of cleanliness in the voting process, leaving the control of the system’s 
honesty in the hands of a technological elite. 
The VOTESCRIPT system provides an individual verification system allowing 
each voter to check, at specific locations and within a determined time period, if 
his vote has been correctly included, and without being exposed to any kind of 
coercion or the chance of vote selling. Likewise, the presence of Scrutineers 
enables control of the whole electoral process by citizen or candidature groups 
authorized to this target, so that this control is spread out in such a way that it does 
not fall to a corrupt group. 
The VOTESCRIPT system’s strength lies in the auditability of the well-known 
software and hardware, in the publication of the additional information together 
with the final results and in the participation of the citizens through the 
Scrutineers or individual verification. Precautions have also been taken 
throughout the process so as to prevent fraud or coercion by any agent or 
collusion among agents. 
 As the authors of this paper see it, all intellectual and material efforts made in 
this area are worthwhile if they lead to a qualitative improvement of democracy, 
reinforcing its legitimacy.  
VOTESCRIPT: telematic voting system designed to enable final count verification 
 12 
 We understand that this improvement basically lies in researching the 
telematic networks’ potential to facilitate and encourage citizen participation 
while offering the guarantees demanded by democracy.  
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